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news release Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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ROBERT DOLE KANSAS EX OFFICIO ROBERT C BYRD. WEST VIRGINIA EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F MCMAHON STAFF DIRECTOR ERIC D. NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

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Contact: Dave Holliday

(202) 224-1718

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE CALLS FOR INVESTIGATION

Senators Dave Durenberger (R-MN) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stated today that they cannot comment on the veracity or accuracy of recent press reports alleging the existence of a US covert action program relating to Libya. The Chairman and Vice Chairman emphasized their strong agreement with the President that an investigation must be made of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence information concerning Libya.

The two Senators said they have no indication that the Senate Committee compromised any sensitive intelligence information.

"Nevertheless, given the seriousness of this matter, we have begun an internal inquiry," the Senators said.

"That inquiry will include an examination of documents in the possession of the Committee; a review of who had access to those documents and interviews of those who had access, to determine how they handled the material." the Senators said.

The two Senators also stressed their conviction that irresponsible breaches of security by persons having the trust of the United States Government must not be allowed to undermine or distort the integrity of the intelligence oversight process. Furthermore, they stated that while vigorous action must be taken to prevent and punish such breaches of security, the fundamental purpose of intelligence, which is to serve the needs of US national security and foreign policy, must be preserved. Access to sensitive intelligence information must not be so limited that it fails to meet the needs of Executive Branch policymakers or the Congress, they said.

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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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SAM NUNN, GEORGIA THOMAS F EAGLETON MISSOURI ERNEST F HOLLINGS SOUTH CAROLINA DAVID L BOREN, OKLAHOMA BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F. MCMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR ERIC D. NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

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CONTACT: DAVE HOLLIDAY (202) 224-1718

Senate Intelligence Committee

Reaction to Defection of DCI William J. Casey

Responding to the recent defection of William Casey to the Soviet Union, Senator Dave Durenberger (R-Minn), Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said today that the Committee would be holding hearings to determine the extent of damage that had been done to U.S. national security.

"Overall, I believe the effect will be mixed," Senator Durenberger said. "Of course, Mr. Casey was privy to some of the country's most sensative secrets. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the KGB will ask Mr. Casey to accept a position in its own management structure."

The Chairman's comment followed a televised press conference from Moscow in which Mr. Casey explained his sudden decision. A TASS interpretor was on hand to provide an English translation of Mr. Casey's comments.

At the press conference, Mr. Casey recalled the past six months, during which time he was repeatedly subjected to such torture and abuse at the hands of U.S. authorities as being repeatedly required to appear before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. "In the end," Mr. Casey said, "I became so dazed and confused that I agreed to support the construction of a National Intelligence Strategy." Mr. Casey went on to say that when the meaning of a National Intelligence Strategy was explained to him, he decided to flee the country.

Durenberger said that it was difficult to predict what the reaction of the other Committee Members would be until after the hearings had been completed. Durenberger admitted that some Members, had only recently learned of Mr. Casey's defection, as the CIA had restricted its first notice of the event to the Chairman and Vice-"They hoped no one would notice, I guess," Durenberger said.

The key task now before the Members, said Durenberger, was to assist in the selection of a replacement for Mr. Casey. "It will be difficult to fill Bill's shoes," observed Durenberger. "I really do not expect to meet another man like him in my lifetime."

11ew Approved For Release 2010/03/12 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000901130006-7 DAVE DURENBERGER MINNESOTA CHAIRMAN PATRICK LEARY VERMONT VICE CHAIRMAN

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

WILLIAM V. ROTH JR. DELAWARE
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MITCH MECHTORNELL KERTUCKY

COUTO GERISER. TEADS
SAM NURM, GEORGIA
THOMAS F EAGLETON MISSOURI
ERNEST F HOLLINGS SOUTH CAROL NA
DAVID L BOREN JKLA-OMA
BILL BRADLEY NEW JERSEY

ROBERT DOLE KANSAS EX OFFICIO ROBERT C BYRD WEST VIRGINIA EX OFFICIO

BERNARD F MCMAHON, STAFF DIRECTOR ERIC D NEWSOM, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

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Contact: Dave Holliday

(202) 224-1718

PHILIPPINES REPORT

- -- President Ferdinand Marcos has no more than three years to pursue fundamental changes in the political and economic structure of the Philippines, before civil unrest combining with a growing military insurgency force change.
- -- The Soviet Union's interest in the Philippine situation appears to be growing just as the insurgency is nearing the point when outside support could become crucial, and at a time when the New Peoples Army is perhaps becoming more receptive to outside support.
- -- Military efforts against the insurgency have been ineffective and prone to abuse. Recently announced intentions to step up military operations, by activating additional units, are unlikely to have significant impact.
- -- The New Peoples Army (NPA) insurgency in the Philippines is growing rapidly. Numbering as many as 30,000 active members, it is operating throughout the country and contesting control of both rural and urban areas.

These are some of the conclusions reached in a staff report released today by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The unclassified report was prepared at the direction of the Committee, following a number of closed briefings on the political, military and economic situations in the Philippines.

The report concludes that economic and political deterioration are fueling civil unrest to the point that fundamental changes in the government will occur within three years.

The report also states the reaction of the Marcos government to the Communist insurgency, "has been inept." The Philippine army, hampered by a defense budget that equals only one percent of the GNP, the lowest in Southeast Asia, is suffering from shortages of supplies and equipment. Pay is poor and medical care is often non-existent. The report states that a disproportionate number of military units are concentrated in Manila and that there is "no logistical system worthy of the name."

Poor leadership, poor training and corruption in the officer corps will not be helped by a reactivation of some infantry batallions as now being proposed, the report says.

"Manpower is not the major problem facing the armed forces," says the report, "and the new units may simply aggravate already serious logistical problems."

In a section entitled, "Soviet Interests", the report notes Soviet activity has increased recently with indirect contact being established through unions affiliated with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. While the NPA has so far relied on domestic sources of arms and funds, there is a growing common interest between Moscow and the NPA. The U.S.S.R. Mission in Manila has been expanded and "Soviet officials are actively making the rounds", the report says.

"Moscow apparently believes that, unlike the 1970's, conditions for revolution are becoming favorable", the report goes on.

Other sections of the report deal with the history of the insurgency, the political situation, the deteriorating economy, Clark Field and Subic Bay, the view of the Philippines by other ASEAN countries and the prospects for the future.

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